DERADICALISATION AS A WAY OF TACKLING FUTURE TERRORISM: INDONESIAN EXPERIENCE

Achmad Gunaryo

gunaryo62@gmail.com
Universitas Islam Negeri Walisongo
Semarang

Abstract

Radicalism in the perspective of the National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT) is not only a radical view but also in the form of all forms of intolerant attitudes and behavior, rejecting Pancasila, takfiri, and khilafah. Indonesia through the BNPT has responded to the emergence of the phenomenon of radicalism and terrorism in Indonesia. In the international world, Indonesia itself even claims itself as a victim of terrorism. In the deradicalism program, there are two approaches applied by BNPT, namely the hard and soft approach. A hard approach is applied to those who have been involved in radical acts and violence, and terrorists. This hard approach usually takes the form of law enforcement and security. The soft approach is applied to the general public as well as terrorist prisoners and their families, former terrorist prisoners and their families, and terrorism networks.

Keywords: Radicalism, soft approach, hard approach, deradicalism program.

A. INTRODUCTION

Reconciliation is increasingly unlikely if the ideology is considered a religious ideology. This is mainly because claims of religious truth have no falsification (Ahmed, 1992: 27). Claims of religious truth need no proof. Myth also played. All that is needed is faith. Understood this way, thus, there is no religious ideological conflict that is completely resolved, especially in the form of reconciliation. We can see several examples of cases of religious ideological conflict in Indonesia that have not been successfully resolved. The Ahmadiya in West Nusa Tenggara has not been able to return to, after being driven from, their hometown until now. Likewise, the Shia case in Sampang has not shown adequate resolution. Gafatar followers who were driven out of West Kalimantan are still scattered, losing property they once owned. Some of the examples above show how most religious ideological conflicts fail to be reconciled socially. If we agree that radicalism is a factor that drives terrorism (Hasani and Naipospos, 2012: 2 ; Lombardi dkk, 2014), then it must be discarded, not reconciled. In this view, if the ultimate goal is the erosion of terrorism, it seems that the use of the term reconciliation is seen as not strategic and avoided. Since the beginning, therefore, the government prefers the term deradicition. Deradicalization means actions or processes that can cause someone with extreme views to adopt a more moderate position. Deradicalizing someone implies a sincere change in mindset and worldview. If related to terrorism, the term refers to counterterrorism measures which aim at making those who have extreme and violent religious or political ideologies adopt a more moderate and nonviolent view. Deradicalization is seen as more effective and even most effective than others, to deal with processes of radicalization, where individuals or groups gradually develop a mindset that increases the risk of violent extremism or terrorism.

In Law Number 5 of 2018 article 34D paragraph (1) deradicalization is defined as '... a planned, integrated, systematic and continuous process carried out to eliminate or reduce and reverse the radical

understanding of terrorism that has occurred' (https://www.hukumonline.com/pusatdata/view/ nprt/542). With the description at the beginning of this paper, the definition in the Act adopted the view that radicalism already exists. This law thus answers the question of how to resolve existing radicalism. Anyway, if observed in this definition there is no element of voluntary unification, but force; namely forcing it to a certain destination. This is the position taken by the state so far, certainly not denying other efforts, especially through educational institutions to prevent radicalism.

Radicalism in the perspective of the National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT) is not only a radical view but also in the form of all forms of intolerant attitudes and behavior, rejecting Pancasila, takfiri, and khilafah (Kuliah Umum Setama BNPT di Universitas Jenderal Achmad Yani: Perlu Critical Thinking Untuk Lawan Radikalisme dan Terorisme".www.bnpt.go.id/kuliah-umum-sestama-bnpt-di-universitas -jenderal-achmad-yani-perlu-critical-thinking-untuk-lawan-radikalisme -dan-terorisme.html). Such a formalistic view can be understood because it is these four things that have been perceived as endangering Indonesia's integrity both as a nation and state. Intolerance indicates the unwillingness to accept different people's views, beliefs or behavior. Rejecting Pancasila means rejecting the founding fathers' agreement in the formation of the Republic of Indonesia. This means dissolving the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI). Takfiri means to disbelieve not only limited to fellow Muslims, but also to adherents of other religions. Those who embrace takfiri easily declare apostasy to their neighbors who disagree, even though they are of one religion. Takfiri is also often addressed to the government or the authorities. While the Khilafah is a system of political leadership that is based on Islam as they understand it. This leadership system knows no territorial boundaries but religion, Islam or not Islam. That is why this kind of leadership, as far as Muslim society, there is only one head of state - the caliphate.

Perhaps in such a perspective, in history we can see that one of the characteristics of the khilafah is a great desire to carry out territorial expansion. Indonesian territory alone is not enough because Muslims are spread in many countries. If this is so then Indonesia will disappear. An example that can be seen is the case of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). ISIS wants to establish an Islamic state that exceeds territorial boundaries that have existed so far. The ideals of supporting ISIS are to make Islam a single category in global politics (Esposito & Mogahed, 2007; Hoft, 2015). If that desire is reached, for example, the Iraqi and Syrian states will disappear. Not to mention that in terms of social stratification that will be formed, those who are not Muslim will have the potential to become second class citizens. Society at a minimum will be divided into two categories, Muslim or infidel with all its consequences.

The four things as mentioned above are intolerance, rejecting Pancasila, takfiri, and khilafah, in the context of Indonesia, appearing in the form of violence and terrorism. To a certain extent their movement is suspected of having political support from opposition political parties. They openly voiced so as not to pray corpses that disagree with their Islamic undestanding. They also held a parade of kindergarten children openly where the children wore black and veiled clothes and carried weapons replicas. They also did not hesitate to drive away people who did not agree with their religious understanding.

Radical movements have also entered into government and education institutions. In line with the hardening of religious life in Indonesia, Islamic spiritual activities (Rohis) at schools were suspected of having been infiltrated by many radical ideologies through mosque activities. This activity is usually wrapped up in the Basic Leadership Training (LDK) model activities that usually take place on campuses. It is in this LDK that students are indoctrinated with the tarbawi religious teachings of their trainers.

Why does their LDK model take the same form of activity as it takes place on campus? The answer is simple. The children were actually prepared to become

cadres. And when they later go to college, they will join the campus missionary organization with the same model and method. So the spiritual activity is an early preparation activity for the next stage, especially in tertiary institutions. So far, according to Setara's research, there are ten universities suspected of having been infiltrated by radical ideas. The ten tertiary institutions are the University of Indonesia, Syarief Hidayatullah State Islamic University, Bandung Institute of Technology, Sunan Gunung Djati State Islamic University Bandung, Bogor Agriculture Institute, Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta State University, Brawijaya University, Airlangga University, and Mataram University

Not only universities, even mosques have been exposed to radicalism. State Intelligence Agency (BIN) reports that many mosques belonging to ministries and institutions have been exposed to radicalism. BIN reported that out of 100 mosques belonging to a combination of ministries, institutions and BUMN, 41 mosques had been exposed to radical understanding. Most that have been exposed are BUMN-owned mosques. The spread of these radical teachings generally has a common goal, namely to replace Pancasila. If the goal is so, then it is not difficult to guess who is behind the infiltration movement. They are the Muslim Brotherhood and Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI). These two organizations are the busiest, campaigning for the rejection of democracy, on the one hand, and promoting the khilafah on the other. The latest rumor says that the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) has entered the ranks of the bearers of the Khilafah understanding. HTI has been dissolved by the Government, FPI has not, but its license as an organization has expired. Right now they are waiting for the extension of the permit, which seems, in the writer's opinion, will not be extended given the FPI's past 'sins.'

B. RESULT AND DISCUSSION

Indonesia through the BNPT has responded to the emergence of the phenomenon of radicalism and terrorism in Indonesia. In the international world,

Indonesia itself even claims itself as a victim of terrorism (Soliman, Bellaj, & Khelifa, 2016; Cherney dan Hartley 2015; Vermeulen 2014). The response shown by Indonesia was to create a de-radicalization program. This program is aimed at all levels of society, especially those who have been exposed to radicalism. This last category includes terrorist inmates and their families, former terrorist prisoners and their families, and terrorism networks. Community categories include sympathizers, supporters and even militants.

In the deradicalism program, there are two approaches applied by BNPT, namely the hard and soft approach. A hard approach is applied to those who have been involved in radical acts and violence, and terrorists. This hard approach usually takes the form of law enforcement and security. The soft approach is applied to the general public as well as terrorist prisoners and their families, former terrorist prisoners and their families, and terrorism networks. It is said to be a soft approach because in this de-radicalization activity the prioritizing of persuasive methods takes precedence.

There are two goals to be addressed by a soft approach. First is society in general. Included in this category are for example schools, tertiary institutions, religious education institutions such as pesantren, and informal religious activities such as recitals or majelis taklim and other social forums. The main objective is to raise awareness of the dangers of radicalism. Not only that, they are also encouraged to form a kind of neighborhood watch. The deterrent power of radicalism in the form of the ability to recognize, detect and prevent radical behavior is thus expected to arise from the community itself.

One important step to foster community's ability to recognize, detect and prevent radical behavior is through media literacy. Media literacy is the ability to understand, analyze, and deconstruct media imagery. Media in the information technology era has extraordinary power to define the situation. Lots of people see 'news' in the media as unquestionable truth. Media literacy education is intended to promote awareness of media influence and create an active

attitude towards consumption and media creation. Media literacy is intended so that humans as media consumers become aware of the way media is constructed and accessed.

With this understanding, the community is able to choose, sort and assess the information they receive from the media. If the spread of radical ideology often uses the media and is quite effective, then the effort to deradicalize is also done by building counter (narrative) radicalism by using the media. Similar to the promotion of radicalization via the media, promotion of counter radicalization narrative development is also carried out by considering the social segment to be addressed.

Not only to the general public, a soft approach is also applied to all terrorists who have been convicted and ex-convicted. What is interesting in the training of inmates and ex-convicts is the involvement of fellow prisoners and ex-convicts as mentors (resource persons). Of course prisoners and ex-terrorist inmates are chosen from those who have been resocialized to become 'Indonesians' again.

Community based is a system of de-radicalization implemented in the community. What is meant by community based is that the processes of de-radicalization take place in places where humans gather. That could be in the form of educational institutions ranging from elementary to tertiary institutions, pesantren, majlis ta'lim, halaqah, places of worship, and in other community forums. As for prisoners, resocialization takes place inside the jail. Deradicalization to the public is mainly intended to increase awareness of the dangers of radicalism. In addition, the community is also expected to have deterent power to radicalism. The deterrent power to radicalism in the form of the ability to recognize, detect and prevent radical behavior is thus expected to arise from the community itself.

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Beyond that, the development of counter-radicalism discourse also appears not only in government institutions but also in society. The concept of Islam Nusantara in Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Islam Berkemajuan in Muhammadiyah has a deep political impact, especially to reduce understandings and movements that are not in accordance with Islamic culture in Indonesia. In fact, the concept is often used to attack symbols that are considered or have the potential to carry radical Islam such as syar'i hijab, cloaked pants, beards, equating Arab clothing with Islam, and others. A number of the last concepts above are often perceived as Islamic, and give rise to an inverted understanding (mafhum mukhalafah) that different from that is not Islamic.

Meanwhile, in the concept of the Islam Nusantara, namely Islam as it grows and lives in the archipelago and has become part of the identity of the Indonesian nation, Islam is percepted as full of grace, tolerance, and avoiding extremism. Likewise the concept of Islam Berkemajuan carries the message that the initiation of any change must be based on aspects of civilization. On the contrary, every effort that carries destructive power must be avoided. Radicalism does not bring progress but decline.

The spirit to bring up the concept or counter discourse as a counter-radicalism measure seems

increasingly crowded in Indonesia. Islam wasathiyah is another concept of counter radicalization Amin, 2015; Karni, 2015). This concept is said to have also been adopted later by the United Nations (UN) to promote tolerance, not extreme, to prioritize deliberation, not seeing oneself as the most correct, and always oriented towards peace (Haddad dan Golson 2007; Haddad dan Balz 2008; Rascoff 2012). Saudi Arabia itself is also said to have been tired of its extreme wahabi ulama, and now embraces the concept of wasathiyah. As a counter-radicalism measure, Islamic Universities (PTKN) in Indonesia are competing to promote Wasathiyah Islam. Many writings on the internet also preach that Ihwanul Muslimin who used to carry the concept of radicalism in Egypt, now uses the concept of wasathiyah as a line of struggle.

People may still have many different opinions about the meaning of a term. As usual, meaning is always related to context. But for me, what's interesting is the deradicalization of the millennial model by bringing up terms that aim to counter radicalism need to be appreciated. This is considering that in the radicalization processes a lot is done by exploiting concepts or jargon. Halal tourism, hijab syar'i, bid'ah, hijrah, heresy, fa'i, infidels, jihad, khilafah, taghut, martyrdom, and the like are some examples of concepts that are exploited in such a way in radicalism. If for some people the concepts mentioned above are considered to be inherent in the word Islam and are thus prescribed by Islam, and apparently also have the power to change behavior, then presenting other terms and exploiting them in such a way, becomes crucial as a counter-radicalization step. Maybe this is what is meant by de-radicalization. From the description above, it seems that there is a general understanding that radicalism in Indonesia is related to political issues, that is to change government. Religion is only used as a means of justifying their behavior. The question is why religion (Islam)? Why Islam? And why Indonesia? To answer this question, I try to answer from the other side of what is usually expressed by some observers.

In terms of the constitution, Indonesia is not a religious state (theocracy), nor is it secular. Indonesia is

a Pancasila country. Pancasila as the basis of the state places the precepts of the Almighty God as the soul of all other precepts. Therefore, the whole process of life as a nation and state must be theologically responsible (to God). As a Pancasila state, the existence of religion in the practice of state administration is seen as important. Every public policy will be opposed if it is considered to be contrary to religious values or teachings.

Indonesia is a country that is very open to religion and belief. Openness to religion (unlimited) on the one hand and acceptance of democracy on the other makes Indonesia a very unique position. Indonesia is a destination for the spread of any religion. Religion or ideology that does not sell in a secular country and is rejected in a theocratic country, freely entering Indonesia. It is this openness that is utilized by the radical Hizb ut-Tahrir not only to enter, but also to flourish in Indonesia, before being banned. It lives and develops in the name of democracy, a concept it actually rejects.

Indonesia is truly a very open country. I was so open that one can say with certainty how many religions there are in Indonesia. The usual answers given are many. But how many, no one knows. And there is no official record. Each ministry and agency has its own record. Not only the number of religions, even the number of places of worship there is no unity of calculation. Once opened, anyone may and can be a preacher. There are no qualifications people can become preachers. Every time the country wants to regulate, there will always be resistance with 'defeat' on the part of the country. Mubaligh should be treated as a profession.

Meanwhile the state requires every citizen to embrace a religion. Religion is promoted and lived by the state. Atheism is banned in Indonesia. This situation makes religion in Indonesia not only flourish, but also become an economic commodity. As a commodity, it must obey the laws of the market which always move based on the principle of supply and demand. Religion becomes a merchandise that is traded. Many mubaligh who live economically well from the sale of religion.

Although not yet considered a profession (and therefore not taxed on it), preaching as economic activity is considered normal. The missionary/mubaligh will reject any regulatory effort that s/he feels will potentially hinder their sales. They will with all their might maintain that their 'stalls' remain open and in demand. Among adherents of religions in Indonesia, Muslims as the majority social category seem to take up the largest portion of the division of democracy cake. A variety of Islamic ideologies with various motivations were brought into Indonesia without selection and subsequently sold freely. This included radical ideology. This is what distinguishes Indonesia from other countries. In many other countries that claim to be Muslim, Jumah's sermon, for example, is always controlled. Khatib throughout the country just read the existing script written nationally. In Indonesia, the preacher can say anything, there is no control. Whereas control in this case is a form of deradicalization.

On the other hand, they will always try to increase the selling value. Because it must always pay attention to what is in demand in the market. Mubaligh also looks like selibrity. And the fact is that there are no mubaligh celebrities who are poor. Those who are in demand are those who are good at creating news values. Supported by a team that is media literate, their actions adorn social media. Their turnover is thus far beyond the assets of traditional missionaries who could be better at mastering the knowledge of their religion. They usually have their own market share. Liberalization of the sale (trade?) of Islam has not yet been the target of religious deradicalization.

E. CONCLUSION

From the narration above, by promoting a soft approach, apart from a number of deficiencies that must be corrected, the de-radicalization program has run relatively well. In various international meetings, Indonesia's deradicalization program is often even called the best and can be emulated by other countries. If measured from the Muslim population where Indonesia is the largest country, then what is achieved by Indonesia is a success. We can see many other smaller Muslim countries, still struggling with radicalism.

This is not to say that Indonesia has succeeded in resolving the problem of radicalism. Radicalism will remain as long as humans still exist.

Even though Indonesia is claimed to be a success, the challenges faced and the burdens carried are still very large, and even the greatest compared to other Muslim countries. This is measured in terms of the Muslim population, population distribution, and area, facing with the concept of an open state. Indonesia needs to develop a more structured, systematic and progressive mechanism of deradicalizaion. With the Pancasila state model as applied so far, Indonesia faces a huge and complex threat of radicalism.

If the state supports the spread of religion and 'forces' its citizens to embrace religion (so as not to be atheist), then ideally at the same time the state must have a mechanism to monitor how religion is spread (propagated). We have always felt disturbed by the term liberal, but allowed the spread of religion to be so liberal. In other words, we are more often concerned about the results than the process. Radicalization processes often go unnoticed. Instead we more often focus on those who have (already) been exposed to radicalism.

If this logic is acceptable, then the question is whether the government dares to exercise control over the process or activities of spreading religion. Pancasila has the Pancasila Ideology Development Board (BPIP), so religion should be.

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