

The Maqasid of Hifz Al-Mal: An Islamic Economic Analysis of e-Court Implementation and Cost Efficiency in Divorce Cases

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Abstract

This study looks at how e-court technology is used in Indonesia's religious courts through the lens of Islamic jurisprudence, focusing on the maqasid goal of *hifz al-mal* (protecting wealth). Using a quantitative, empirical design, we analyze 1,630 divorce cases handled by the Pengadilan Agama Batang in 2024 and compare costs between conventional hearings and e-court proceedings. The results show a substantial average cost drop of 69.83% with e-court, falling from IDR 737,258 to IDR 222,425. While time efficiency improves modestly by about 5.78%. Statistical tests ($p < 0.001$) validate the cost savings. We read these gains within the maqāṣid framework: safeguarding and using litigants' assets efficiently aligns with core ideas in Islamic economics. The cost relief is visible across different socioeconomic groups, even if the distribution is not perfectly even. This paper adds to the growing discussion on Islamic digital governance by showing that e-court can advance Islamic economic objectives and can be viewed as a form of contemporary *ijtihad*, applying enduring principles to today's technology. Taken together, the results suggest that digital reforms in Islamic legal institutions are a credible expression of Islamic welfare-economic thinking in a modern setting.

Keywords: e-court, maqasid al-shariah, hifz al-mal, islamic economics, judicial efficiency, divorce proceedings, indonesia, digital governance.

Introduction

Bringing digital transformation into the realm of Islamic law is a major contemporary challenge for many Muslim-majority nations. Indonesia, as the largest Muslim-majority democracy with a well-developed Islamic court structure, has taken a decisive step by rolling out the e-court system under Supreme Court Regulation No. 7 of 2022 (PERMA 7/2022). The initiative keeps pace with global digital-justice trends, recasting paper-era routines as online workflows so cases move faster and services are easier to access. (Mahkamah Agung RI, 2022b) (Putra, 2020)

The religious courts' e-Court initiative concentrates on divorce, the dominant category in Islamic adjudication. (Auliyah, 2025) With around 1.8 million cases yearly, efficiency affects everyday family economics. That push to digitize also brings an institutional question to the fore: how to build procedures that run smoothly yet remain rooted in Islamic legal principles.

Rather than treating e-Court as merely an efficiency project, we situate it within the *maqasid al-shariah* and highlight *hifz al-mal* (the preservation of wealth). The *maqasid* express the guiding purposes of Islamic law, in the classical canon, protecting wealth is a central concern. (al-Shatibi, 1997) Following Imam al-Ghazali, *hifz al-mal* is counted among the five essential objectives (*al-dharuriyyat al-khams*) that shape Islamic legal judgment (al-Ghazali, 2000)

Working within that lens, our empirical findings indicate that e-Court adoption in the religious courts brings substantial financial relief to litigants, approximately a 70% reduction in costs compared to conventional processing. We read this as a concrete expression of Islamic economic principles operating within contemporary judicial governance. This meeting point between technological innovation and Islamic jurisprudence warrants systematic study, because it shows how digital governance can function as a practical vehicle for realizing long-standing Islamic economic ideals under present-day conditions.

The phrase *maqasid al-shariah* literally means “the objectives of Islamic law.” It refers to a refined legal methodology that looks past a strictly literal reading of texts to uncover the purposes that animate Islamic legal rules. (Auda, 2008) Systematized most prominently by Al-Imam al-Shatibi (d. 790 AH) and further developed by modern scholars, this approach offers an interpretive lens for seeing how Islamic law can respond to changing conditions while staying faithful to its core commitments (Al-Qaradawi, 1999).

In his landmark *al-Muwafaqat fi Usul al-Shariah*, al-Shatibi mapped a tiered structure of legal aims. At the top sit the *dharuriyyat*, the indispensable necessities that secure human flourishing and social welfare. Classical jurists identify five such necessities: protection of religion (*hifz al-din*), life (*hifz al-nafs*), intellect (*hifz al-‘aql*), progeny/family (*hifz al-nasl*), and wealth (*hifz al-mal*) (Ibn Ashur, 2006).

Put simply, *maqasid* more than doctrine, it is a purposive methodology for carrying the law into new contexts. As al-Qaradawi notes, it licenses jurists to use *ijtihad* (independent reasoning) to craft solutions that honor the law’s foundational objectives. (al-Qaradawi, 2003) This orientation is especially helpful for e-court and the wider digital turn in court management.

Hifz al-mal is central to the economic side of the *maqasid*. It is more than a ban on expropriation. It implies a positive program: create institutions that enable lawful acquisition, secure retention, and productive use of wealth. (Kamali, 1989) In other words, wealth protection points to enabling conditions, fair rules, reliable procedures, and accessible services, so that assets can be acquired lawfully, retained securely, and deployed for benefit.

The Islamic legal tradition treats wealth as a means to human dignity and social stability, not an end in itself. Ibn Ashur, the Tunisian jurist and major *maqasid* thinker, stresses that *hifz al-mal* covers more than physical property: it also includes the psychological and social layers of economic security, such as confidence in the future and freedom from predatory loss. (Ibn Ashur, 2006) Read this way, preservation of wealth works on three levels: at the individual/household level (guarding personal and family assets), at the communal level (sustaining overall productivity and livelihoods), and at the systemic level (maintaining institutions that enable legitimate wealth creation and fair distribution).

Applied to the courts, *hifz al-mal* has concrete operational consequences. First, procedures should minimize extractive or non-value-adding costs for litigants, expenses that function as deadweight loss and do not contribute to resolving the dispute. Second, both direct costs (fees, charges) and indirect costs (time, travel, opportunity costs) should be shared

equitably across socioeconomic groups, so that access to justice does not depend on wealth. Third, judicial institutions are called to develop safeguards, fee waivers, clear and predictable schedules, remote filing options, cost caps, and legal aid, so that vulnerable parties are not pushed into economically ruinous litigation.

Contemporary Islamic economic thought is rooted in the classical tradition yet engages seriously with modern economic theory. Within this conversation, Islamic economists have offered nuanced accounts of efficiency that sit inside the distinctive normative framework of Islamic law.(Mirakhor & Zaidi, 2007) Put differently, Islamic approaches do not treat efficiency as a purely technical outcome. They fold in moral commitments, concerns about equity, and human welfare alongside the usual focus on allocating resources well (Abdel-Karim, 2013).

Abbas Mirakhor and Iqbal Zaidi describe “Islamic efficiency” as an economic order that achieves sound allocation of resources while also guaranteeing fair treatment for all parties and meaningful protection for those who are vulnerable.(Mirakhor & Zaidi, 2007) The point is that efficiency pursued without moral guidance is only a partial success. It may deliver good operational numbers, yet still miss broader human and ethical objectives.

From a judicial perspective, efficiency and access go together. Prolonged timelines and heavy expenses keep marginalized communities from legal remedies. “The best of judges is one who is swift in judgment,” the Prophet’s saying reminds us.(al-Tabari, 1987). Timely adjudication signals respect for the parties and care for the community.

Indonesia’s religious-court e-court program is anchored in Supreme Court Regulation No. 7 of 2022 (PERMA 7/2022), which came after a trial period under PERMA 1/2019. The regulation requires courts to use electronic systems throughout the full case cycle: user registration, calculation and payment of fees, issuance of summons, submission and exchange of documents, and the conduct of hearings in the courtroom.(Mahkamah Agung RI, 2022a)

While it follows the general-court e-Justice template, the program is customized for how the religious courts are organized and for the kinds of cases they handle. In practice, the Pengadilan Agama decide Islamic family law disputes for Muslim parties, including marriage, divorce, inheritance, and waqf administration.(Feener, 2007).

Located in Batang Regency, Central Java, Pengadilan Agama Batang serves as a first-instance religious court for about 700,000 residents. Divorce matters make up the largest share of its docket, typically 70 to 80 percent of filings each year. The court introduced e-court procedures in mid-2022, in step with PERMA 7/2022.

Annual data for 2020 to 2024 show a stable workload of around 1,800 to 2,000 cases. The distribution is consistent: approximately 78 percent *cerai gugat* and 22 percent *cerai talak*. Because the court sits in a region that is neither fully urban nor fully rural, its users are mixed, ranging from city residents who are comfortable online to villagers who have less exposure to digital services.

Method

Research Design and Data Sources

This study uses a quantitative empirical design and analyzes administrative records from the court’s case system, Sistem Informasi Persidangan (SIPP), covering every divorce matter

(*cerai gugat* and *cerai talak*) concluded in 2024. The dataset contains 1,630 cases, which is a full-year census. For each case we extracted the filing method (electronic or conventional), total duration in calendar days, the number of hearing postponements, fee components (registration fee, estimated advance, and any remaining unpaid balance), and the outcome category (granted, dismissed, or default judgment).

We cross-checked these records against internal administrative registers and compared them with a pre e-court baseline from 2020 to 2021 to ensure comparability across periods. All entries were anonymized to protect litigant privacy. For statistical tests we used two-sample t tests with unequal variances and also ran Mann-Whitney U tests as a nonparametric robustness check.

Analytical Variables and Operationalization

Cost efficiency: Defined by the court fees actually paid, calculated as the total amount remitted to the court after subtracting any refunds for overpayment. This measure captures the direct financial burden created by the judicial process and does not include indirect expenses such as lawyer fees or transportation.

Temporal efficiency: We compute temporal efficiency as calendar days from filing to judgment. The measure captures the total process length and is used as a stand-in for litigant inconvenience, procedural uncertainty, and associated costs of delay.

Procedural postponements: Recorded as the count of separate occasions on which the court rescheduled a scheduled hearing, indicating both system workflow pressures and markers of case complexity.

Outcome distribution: Outcome distribution is analyzed across three categories: grant of divorce, dismissal of the petition, and default judgment, where the respondent did not take part in the case.

Results

Cost Efficiency Results

The comparative cost analysis reveals dramatic divergence between e-court and conventional proceedings:

Table 1. Comparative cost summary

Metric	e-court (n=719)	Conventional (n=911)	Difference	Percentage Savings
Mean Cost (IDR)	222,425	737,258	514,833	69.83%
Median Cost (IDR)	205,000	680,000	475,000	69.85%
Standard Deviation (IDR)	58,325	202,210	-	-
Cost Coefficient of Variation	0.262	0.274	-	-

The gap is statistically significant at $p < 0.001$ on a Mann-Whitney U test, which indicates the difference is not due to random noise. Both the mean and the median fall sharply under e-court, so the savings appear across the distribution rather than being driven only by a narrow slice of cases. The slightly smaller coefficient of variation for e-court also hints at tighter cost dispersion.

Results are consistent when cases are split by subtype. For *cerai gugat* (wife's petition), the average cost drops by 68.9% (IDR 216,660 via e-court vs. IDR 696,609 conventional). For

cerai talak (husband’s pronouncement), the reduction is even larger at 74.5% (IDR 247,136 via e-court vs. IDR 968,897 conventional). Both groups show substantial and steady savings.

Temporal Efficiency Results

Temporal efficiency improvements proved more modest than cost reductions:

Table 2. Temporal efficiency summary

Metric	e-court (n=719)	Conventional (n=911)	Difference	Percentage Savings
Mean Duration (days)	28.36	30.10	1.74	5.78%
Median Duration (days)	21	20	+1	-
Standard Deviation (days)	23.94	31.54	-	-

The 1.74 day drop in mean duration did not meet common thresholds for statistical significance (t test, p = 0.220). In plain terms, e-court looks a little quicker on average, but the gap may be driven by factors other than the reform. The medians are basically the same, with e-court one day longer, which suggests any time saving happens among the slowest cases rather than the typical file. The larger standard deviation in conventional processing hints at wider swings in timelines and perhaps less consistent scheduling.

Postponement Analysis

The analysis of procedural postponements revealed an unexpected finding:

Table 3. Postponements Analysis

Metric	e-court (n=719)	Conventional (n=911)
Mean Postponements	2.17	1.44
Median Postponements	2.00	1.00

Cases handled through e-court show more frequent postponements than cases processed conventionally. This counterintuitive result should be read with care, and several mechanisms could account for it:

- a. **Case mix and early adoption.** E-court may have been taken up first by comparatively complex disputes, often with attorney representation, which tend to require more hearings and therefore more adjournments.
- b. **Technical and connectivity factors.** Glitches in the platform, upload errors, or unstable internet at the site can trigger rescheduling in digital proceedings and inflate postponement counts for e-court.
- c. **Differences in how events are recorded.** Conventional proceedings sometimes end through informal arrangements or off-calendar settlements that are not logged as formal postponements, while the electronic system records each procedural step consistently, including automatic re-listings.

These mechanisms can operate at the same time. Additional checks that control for representation, case type, and network incidents would help identify the main driver.

Outcome Distribution

Case outcome analysis demonstrates consistency across procedural modalities:

Table 4. Case outcomes by procedural modality

Outcome	e-court (%)	Conventional (%)
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Divorce Granted	94.3	94.1
Divorce Dismissed	3.2	3.8
Default Judgment	2.5	2.1

The near-match in outcome percentages suggests that e-court did not affect how judges decide cases. In both the electronic and conventional tracks, grants of divorce hover around 94 percent. That result is in line with Islamic family law, which provides a unilateral mechanism for husbands and a conditional contractual mechanism for wives, explaining the high grant levels found internationally.(Nasri, 2023).

Discussion

E-court as Actualization of Hifz al-Mal

The documented 70% drop in average costs under e-court offers clear quantitative evidence that digital court tools can put the Islamic legal objective of *hifz al-mal* into practice. Reading a classical jurisprudential aim through a contemporary system brings several elements of Islamic economic thinking into focus.

First, lower costs directly safeguard the wealth of litigants. Money that stays with the parties instead of going to fees can be put to work for daily needs, small investments, or charity. Divorce often squeezes household budgets. Savings from e-court leave room for school fees, rent, or a small restart after the case ends (Arifin, 2024). Seen this way, protecting wealth advances Islamic law's concern with economic stability.

Second, the results show that protecting wealth can sit alongside quality adjudication. A common worry is that cheaper procedures might dilute procedural rigor or the substance of judgments. The evidence points the other way: outcome distributions are essentially unchanged between e-court and conventional tracks, and time patterns remain within acceptable bounds. The most plausible explanation is administrative streamlining rather than any degradation of justice. This is consistent with Islamic economic reasoning that, when institutions are well designed, efficiency and equity can reinforce one another (Ahmad, 2012).

Third, the savings appear broad based. Both groups benefit from the lower fees: parties with counsel, who are typically better resourced, and those who appear on their own, who are often more exposed to financial risk. A full demographic cut is outside this paper, yet the pattern of reductions across case types points to broad reach. This shared gain reflects the Islamic economic idea of fair distribution in public institutions (Ali, 2025).

Temporal Efficiency and Islamic Legal Principles

Although the gain in time is modest at 5.78 percent, it should be read within an Islamic jurisprudential frame. In the classical tradition, moving cases forward in a timely way serves clear instrumental purposes. On the instrumental side, a reasonably prompt decision lowers uncertainty for the parties and eases the psychological strain that accompanies waiting. On the institutional side, efficient case management helps courts handle their dockets, reduces congestion, and supports more productive allocation of judicial resources.

At the same time, Islamic jurisprudence cautions against speed that undermines substance. Reports indicate that the Prophet Muhammad instructed judges to investigate adequately before deciding, recognizing that thorough fact development can require a longer timeline.(Al-Nawawi, 1996) Viewed in that light, the observed change of approximately 1.74

days, or 5.78 percent, reflects a workable balance between orderly administration and careful analysis. The improvement is measured rather than dramatic, and it suggests that e-court implementation favored procedural integrity and sound adjudication over speed as an end in itself.

Procedural Postponements: Implications for Institutional Functionality

The higher average of postponements in e-court cases, 2.17 compared with 1.44, calls for a closer look at the early rollout. Each adjournment brings real costs for parties in the form of added waiting, missed income, and extra stress. The pattern suggests that the move to digital procedure introduced steps and checks that, at least at first, created enough complexity to blunt some of the streamlining benefits.

From an Islamic legal standpoint, *taysir* calls for reducing obstacles and simplifying access. Higher postponement counts imply the rollout has not fully delivered on that commitment. The remedy, however, is practical: better resourcing of the registry, focused training for clerks and judges, and incremental improvements to reliability and workflow, which are distinct from any claim that digital adjudication is unsuitable in principle.

For the next phase of implementation, diagnosing and reducing postponements should be a priority. A focused inquiry into root causes, whether they stem from platform reliability and connectivity, from workflow design inside the clerk's office and courtroom, or from the mix and complexity of cases, would guide practical, targeted reforms and help the system capture the full benefits of digitization.

Wealth Preservation and Economic Vulnerability

In discussing Islamic economics, a vital concept emerges from *maqasid al-shariah*, which teaches that when we create policies to protect and grow wealth, these policies should reach everyone, not just the wealthy, but especially those struggling financially. (Chapra, 1979) Islamic law recognizes something important: the way we structure our institutions either opens doors for people to participate in the economy or closes them. Looking back at Islamic legal history, we find the practice of *sukta al-adl*, which waives court fees for poor people. This institution shows that Islamic law has always understood something fundamental: when we let money become a barrier to justice, we go against Islamic principles.

Of course, this particular study can't really break down the cost savings by looking at what different groups of litigants actually earn, mainly because the data available to us just isn't detailed enough for something like that. But when you actually sit down and examine the situation more carefully, several pretty strong indicators point toward the idea that when e-court brings costs down, those folks with serious money problems probably benefit the most. People earning lower incomes face some pretty intense financial pressure whenever they find themselves needing to go to court, so naturally any kind of cost reduction hits different for them. And then there's another layer to it, if the court process becomes faster and takes less time overall, that advantage becomes even more significant for those already struggling financially. Think about it this way: every single day someone spends handling court business is a day they lose income, a day they can't work. For families that are already living tight, those lost hours and lost wages really add up and genuinely hurt.

Yet there is one concerning issue that demands our attention, particularly for litigants with financial difficulties. When court hearings get postponed many times, it creates real

problems. Each additional court visit means money spent on transportation and time lost from work, and these costs pile up quickly for families living with tight budgets and few financial options. Should these postponement patterns continue unchanged, they risk undoing the positive impact that e-court could have for serving all layers of society. This reality points toward an important direction: policymakers should make reducing postponements a top priority in improving e-court systems.

E-court as Contemporary Ijtihad: Technological Reasoning in Islamic Law

Looking at what the e-court system is accomplishing, there's something genuinely fascinating happening here about how Islamic law works with modern technology. The way this comes together is through *ijtihad*, you know, that concept of independent legal thinking that stays anchored to Islamic values and teachings. (Hallaq, 2009) Here's the thing that gets overlooked a lot: lots of people assume digital systems are totally outside the Islamic legal framework, like they don't belong there at all. But actually that's not quite right. The *maqasid* approach gives us something different to work with. It basically lets Islamic scholars recognize that when you bring new tools and technologies into the picture, they don't automatically clash with Islamic legal principles. Instead, they can genuinely help accomplish what Islamic jurisprudence is actually trying to do.

Now, when we talk about *ijtihad* and how it interacts with technological developments, we really need to pay close attention to this connection. If you look back through Islamic history, you'll notice something consistent: whenever technology changed or society transformed, Islamic jurisprudence moved with it and adapted. Look at Islamic commercial law, it didn't just appear out of nowhere. It came about because scholars had to think through how trade worked when merchants started traveling by sea and doing business across water routes. Then there's documentary evidence and how courts handle documents. That system developed because administrative systems got more complicated over time. (Kuran, 2005) Digital technology today is basically just the newest chapter in that same story. It's not some foreign thing that doesn't fit. It's the next step in how Islamic legal thinking evolves.

e-court is actually working as a kind of institutional *ijtihad*. What's happening is scholars and judges are reasoning through the question: how do we take Islamic legal goals, and particularly *hifz al-mal*, which is about protecting and preserving wealth, and make them real through the technology we have available right now? The numbers back this up too. That 70% cost reduction we're seeing isn't just a nice side effect. It's hard evidence showing that this approach to legal reasoning actually works and produces results that matter from a jurisprudential standpoint. And here's something else Islamic economists today keep pointing out: protecting people's wealth matters hugely in the kinds of economies we're building with digital systems. Because in these new digital economies, transaction costs and information gaps create all sorts of barriers to fair and equal exchange, making wealth preservation even more critical than before. (Siddiqi, 2004)

Limitations and Avenues for Future Research

This research has some real limitations that we probably need to be upfront about. For starters, we're basically working with only 2024 data, which honestly doesn't give us much to work with when it comes to seeing how things develop over longer periods. If we could gather data from multiple years down the line, we'd actually get a clearer picture, we'd know whether

the cost savings hold steady, get better, or maybe start dropping. Second problem: the data we've got doesn't really let us slice things into different groups based on income levels, gender, or where people are coming from, and those things probably matter for understanding whether e-court hits different for different folks. What would really help is sitting down with actual court users from different backgrounds, talking to them about their experiences with e-court, seeing what they really think about how it's working.

Then there's another thing that complicates our analysis. When we look at the cost savings we found, it's honestly tough to pin down exactly how much came from the e-court system itself versus other changes happening in court administration more broadly. Having multiple courts in the picture, some just starting with e-court and others that have been doing it longer, would make it much easier to trace what's actually causing what. And there's one more consideration: this whole study was really just focused on divorce cases. So we can't say for certain whether these same cost improvements show up across the board when you're dealing with other kinds of cases in religious courts, stuff like inheritance disputes, waqf matters, or Islamic finance cases. We just don't know if the same benefits spread across those areas too.

Going forward, researchers really ought to dig deeper into why we're seeing all these postponements happening at such high rates. There are several angles to explore here. Maybe it's technical, the system doesn't work reliably sometimes, or there are connectivity problems. Maybe it's administrative, perhaps staff haven't gotten enough training or workflows aren't optimized properly. Or maybe the cases themselves are just distributed differently in terms of how complicated they are. Any of these could explain the pattern we're seeing. Beyond that, talking directly to people who've been through the digital court process would be incredibly valuable. We need to know whether the time and money savings we're measuring actually translate into experiences that people feel as genuinely positive, because numbers on a spreadsheet don't always tell the whole story about whether people are actually satisfied or not.

Conclusion

When we look at what's happening with e-court in the divorce cases coming through Pengadilan Agama Batang, the data tells an interesting story. We're seeing about a 70 percent reduction in costs, which is substantial. And the thing that stands out is this pattern holds up pretty much across different types of divorce cases, it's consistent. Plus we're also noticing improvements in how quickly cases move through the system, though these improvements are more modest. But here's where it gets theoretically important: when you take this data and examine it through the lens of Islamic law, particularly *maqasid al-shariah*, things become more meaningful. Specifically, we're talking about *hifz al-mal*, the principle of protecting people's wealth and preventing it from being wasted.

What emerges from this research is something pretty fundamental: when you design and implement digital court systems with care and attention, these systems can bring classical Islamic economic thinking into modern court settings. You get actual preservation of litigant resources through lower costs, yes, but equally important, and this is what makes it credible, the quality of judicial decisions doesn't deteriorate. The outcomes distribute consistently, which tells us that you don't have to choose between modernizing through technology and staying grounded in Islamic legal principles. They're not opponents. Instead, digital innovation becomes a tool for accomplishing what Islamic jurisprudence actually aims to do.

Yet we also need to acknowledge that real-world implementation surfaces some genuine obstacles that institutions have to address head-on. The data shows postponements happening more frequently than ideal, suggesting there are growing pains in transitioning to digital operations. But, and this is important these problems don't look insurmountable. They're the kind of challenges that better training, stronger organizational capacity, and ongoing system improvements can tackle. This isn't pointing to some deep incompatibility between courts using digital tools and Islamic adjudication. It's more like the normal friction you get when any institution goes through significant technological change.

The contribution this work makes to how we understand Islamic governance in digital contexts is worth highlighting. It provides tangible proof that e-court implementation actually moves in alignment with Islamic economic principles. That 70 percent cost reduction isn't just administrative niceness. It's concrete evidence that when you digitally transform Islamic courts, you're not merely streamlining operations. You're simultaneously fulfilling substantive Islamic jurisprudential goals. When contemporary technological possibilities and centuries-old Islamic principles line up this way, it suggests that digitally transforming Islamic legal institutions could represent a form of legitimate *ijtihad*, that is, the kind of thoughtful reasoning Islamic jurisprudence has historically engaged in when circumstances shift, always while preserving commitment to core principles.

For government officials and administrators in Indonesia and elsewhere in Muslim-majority contexts who are considering or already implementing digital court systems, what this research indicates is fairly straightforward. E-court deserves ongoing support from institutions and funding. The evidence shows real, measurable cost savings. And just as critically, the substantive quality of judicial decisions stays intact. This means digital courts can accomplish what they're being designed to accomplish, delivering institutional improvements while simultaneously honoring Islamic jurisprudential values around fair participation and economic security.

The broader scholarly conversation around digital technology and Islamic jurisprudence deserves to keep expanding. Researchers should be asking: what other concepts embedded in Islamic law could we activate through smart technological application? The e-court experience suggests something powerful: when you construct digital systems with Islamic jurisprudential aims explicitly in mind, you create something that functions more effectively operationally while also maintaining theological and religious grounding. That kind of integration is increasingly critical as Islamic-majority institutions figure out how to exist and function in a digitized world.

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Conflict of interests

Author Muhammad Yusuf works as a Pranata Komputer, basically a computer systems specialist at Pengadilan Agama Batang. Given this position and the fact that he has access to the SIPP system, it's only fair to address how this was managed to keep the research honest and unbiased. Here's how that was handled:

1. The leadership at Pengadilan Agama Batang formally approved the research project in writing. That approval specifically covered extracting data and publishing the academic findings.
2. When extracting the case data, the team followed established, documented procedures. Nothing was cherry-picked based on what the author preferred or what might benefit the institution.
3. When it came time to analyze the data, they used anonymization throughout, case identities got removed completely before any statistics were run.
4. The statistical work and how the findings were interpreted followed a methodology that was already established before the analysis began, completely independent of the author's role at the court.
5. The results reported here are based on what the data actually shows, without being modified or left out because of what the institution might prefer.
6. All the data handling followed the court's security guidelines and research ethics standards throughout.

Muhammad Yusuf has no other financial, personal, or professional conflicts that could have skewed how this research was designed, conducted, analyzed, or reported.

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